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Beyond Democracy: The Effects of the Electoral
System on Environmental Performance -----,
Austin Baird, Rachel Bodily, and Angela Merriam

T

here have been many attempts to explain why some
countries exhibit environmentally friendly attitudes
and pass environmentally protective policies while
others neglect or exploit their natural resources and
environmental amenities. Some researchers have explored the link between democracy and the environment,
determining that there is only a relationship in certain
aspects of environmental protection. I Others have linked
environmental attitudes to economic growth or gross
domestic product (GDP).2 These studies, however, often
fail to explain the variance among countries with similar
ideological trends, income levels, or levels of democracy.
There are important conclusions to be drawn from further examining democratic governments and variances
within these democratic systems and electoral processes.
It is instructive not only to recognize that democracies in
general create greener policies, but to analyze both the
mechanisms and the institutional variance which allow
for these policy differences.
Within democracies, we look at electoral systems as
a central indicator of environment performance. We examine the differences between first past the post (FPTP)
and proportional representation (PR) styles of democracy, and we argue that those countries that utilize PR
systems exhibit better environmental attitudes and policies. Using the existing literature, we first explain key
differences in the two electoral systems and then highlight several causal mechanisms that may explain why
PR systems produce more environmentally friendly policies. We then explain the methodology of the quantitative study and discuss our findings. We spend significant
time on the main independent variable of electoral system. While the mere presence of an FPTP or PR system
does not explain the variance in environmental perfor-

mance, we do show that higher district magnitude, a
more sophisticated measure of a PR system, yields better
environmental performance.

Electoral System
The notion behind PR elections is that each party
should be allotted a number of congressional seats commensurate with the percentage of votes received. While,
technically, PR systems should precisely transfer the percentage of the votes won to the percentage of seats allotted to a certain party, such a policy could lead to a party's
receiving only half of a seat. Consequently, many systems
include some minimum percentage of the vote, a "threshold," that must be reached in order for a party to gain a
seat. The competing electoral system that we examine is
FPTP, a plurality system in which the one open seat goes
to the candidate that captures the most votes, although
not necessarily a majority. This type of system tends to
marginalize smaller parties, as the likelihood of a small
party winning one available seat is low. 3 PR systems, on
the other hand, will encourage multiparty politics due to
the inclusion of small parties. For example, if a "green"
party wins 10 percent of the vote in a PR system, it will
receive about 10 percent of the seats in the legislature,
whereas a plurality system would deny any representation. 4 This fragmentation of the vote in PR systems also
places a greater focus on a coalition approach to politics,
as can be seen in Europe and Latin America, where it is
most popular.s Plurality eschews this approach, as evidenced by the dominance of two major parties in the U.S.
and Great Britain.
Of particular importance to understanding electoral
systems, and specifically the way we measure them in
this paper, is the definition of district magnitude. This
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tenn refers to the average number of candidates elected
in each given district. In a plurality system, each district
elects only one representative in what is appropriately
called a single-member district. PR systems, however,
allow voters to elect multiple candidates per district,
ranging from two to as many as 150 in Slovakia and the
Netherlands." As John Carey7 points out, district magnitude determines the proportionality of a system, or the
ratio of seats to votes. We hypothesize that, to an extent,
higher district magnitude will lead to more equal proportionality and increase the number of parties gaining at
least some level of participation.

Environmental Performance and FPTP Systems
Given these characteristics of the two main electoral
systems, there are two reasons to expect that environmental
perfonnance would be worse in countries with a plurality
system. First, plurality systems require that candidates
appeal to a broad constituency for whom the environment
may not be a common concern. Second, the structure of
plurality systems tend to marginalize smaller, single-issue
parties that may favor the environment.
As previously addressed, FPTP systems require a
party to win more of the vote than the competing parties;
therefore, FPTP systems create a significant barrier to
entry unparalleled in PR systems. In order to obtain such
large percentages, parties must focus their campaigning
efforts on issues that will attract large numbers of voters.
Allan Meltzer and Marc VellrathH suggest that voters give
the most consideration to the question: "Which party
will keep the country prosperous in the years ahead?" In
addition to the focus on economic perfonnance that this
question prompts, Michelle SIone 9 argues that recently
within the U.S., the increased amount of media coverage
dedicated to terrorist threats and attacks has made
national security a detennining factor in elections that is
just as important as the economy. There are likely other
countries with similarly unique issues that directly play
into voter decisions and priorities. With pressing issues,
such as, security and the economy, at stake in FPTP
systems voters are less likely to cast their votes based on
a party's environmental stance. While we acknowledge
that there are some voters who make electoral decisions
based on environmental issues, they are a small enough
minority so as to not affect elections in any major way
in a plurality system. When parties consider the relative
disinterest with which voters view the environment, they
are unlikely to make environmental issues a major plank in
their campaign platfonn, as it does not develop the broad
support base that FPTP systems require. As a respondent
notes in Peter Smith's Democracy in Latin America, "The
single-member district does not guarantee the proportional
representation of parties, but in exchange it is the best at
allowing the representation of the interests that really stir
48

society."lo Regardless of which party wins the election in
a plurality system, environmental policies will not usually
be at the forefront of the agenda and the lack of protective
policy implementation will yield worse environmental
performance in the country involved.
Concomitant with this idea of broad appeal is the
parties' need to appeal to "swing" voters. In FPTP systems,
each party tends to contain a core group of committed
voters who will vote for the party irrespective of which
candidate is fielded. Therefore, the most pressing issue for
most parties is their ability to woo undecided or "swing"
voters. David Gopoian and Sisse Hadjiharalambous show
that these swing voters, defined as those who make their
decision in the last two weeks, are not generally motivated
by typical political or ideological issues. Instead, the
majority of these voters make their selections seemingly
at random, and display a tendency to vote for "the person
who saw them last on Election Day."11 Holding this
hypothesis true, and assuming political parties' ability to
intuit this, electioneering tactics involving the promise
of environmentally friendly issues are unlikely to be
effective, thereby making them unlikely to be offered and
certainly not implemented.
The second reason to expect that FPTP systems would
have worse environmental records is the marginalization
of small and single-interest parties. The role played by
large parties in FPTP systems is apparent enough that the
practically negligible role filled by special interests should
be self-evident. Even so, it is still helpful to mention the
relationship. The nature of FPTP systems tends to marginalize the effect that single issues can have in directly
affecting policy. Instead, they encourage lobbying groups
who certainly wield considerable clout in the fonn of financial contributions but do not take an active role in the
writing of or voting on policy. The difference we wish to
emphasize is that, in PR systems, special interest groups
are able to directly enter the political arena due to the
lower barriers of entry. They are able to fonn coalitions
and write and vote on legislation. This ability does not exist in FPTP systems relegating special interest groups to
mere lobbyist status. Therefore, almost any special interest group with significant power will, of necessity, be a
group with substantial financial backing. These groups are
likely to represent business interests because by definition
businesses have a larger pool of funding to work with, as
any money spent on lobbying can be seen as a financial
"investment." Environmental groups on the other hand
mainly rely on individual philanthropists and other donors
which are relatively parsimonious. 12 The following section will discuss the merits of a PR system due to its more
equitable incorporation of small parties and single issues.
It is also likely that policies in FPTP systems are
less stable than those elected through PRo FPTP parties
must polarize themselves from other parties in an etTort to
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attract voters, and they are not as likely to build coalitions
and compromise with other parties while they are in office.
Thus, they will vacillate among varying environmental
policies. which is ultimately harmful for the environment
because any positive gains during one term will most likely
be negated in the next term when another party is in power.
Because PR allows for more variance, it should allow for
more stable environmental policies and, therefore, higher
environmental performance.

Environmental Performance and PR Systems
It is unlikely that a single-issue group would be able
to enter the political arena in a FPTP system under the
guise of a viable party. Their influence is mostly limited
to lobbying and public-awareness campaigns, and their
effectiveness tends to be limited by their lack of resources.
It is much easier, however, for single-issue groups to effect
political changes in a PR system. In a PR system they have
a chance of gaining real political representation and power
rather than negotiating legislation as a lobbying consortium.
The makeup of a PR system, only a small percentage of
the total vote is necessary in order to gain a seat or two,
facilitates the entry and participation of parties with more
specialized interests. 13 Even though the heightened ease
with which these groups may gain legislative seats is
obvious, it might be tempting to question the efficacy with
which such a seemingly insignificant group could pursue
its agenda. The answer lies in a (PR elected) government's
need for consensus and coalition in order to avoid potential
conflicts and the ensuing impasses of gridlock. 14 This
quality of PR systems, the almost invariable requirement
for various parties to compromise and form a functional
government, is what allows special-interest parties (in
this case environmentally-minded parties) to wield
considerably more influence than they would in other
electoral systems. This creates an atmosphere of giveand-take in which environmental policies are likely to be
passed in return for support on an unrelated matter.
A second issue when considering the effect of the
electorate on environmental policies is the expectations
that voters are likely to have of their fellow voters.
Meltzer and Vellrath l5 note that the economy is the most
important determining factor when individuals decide on
a candidate, and most voters no doubt realize this as well.
Therefore, in a PR system, a voter who feels particular
concern for the environment will vote for a "green"
party without fearing that security or the economy will
be sacrificed, because the majority of the other voters
will determine their choice based on these issues. Our
voter will be secure in the knowledge that the majority
of his neighbors will not share his preoccupation with
the environment. thus facilitating the decision to vote for
a single-issue group and allow his neighbors to vote on
larger issues. 16 Therefore, relatively more people may

vote for single-issue "green" parties without fear of their
actually taking control of the legislature.
Some may argue that the type of electoral system as
related to environmental performance is in fact a spurious
correlation resulting from some sort of norms diffusion.
This result is unlikely, however, as there is no reason that
environmental norms and standards should have any relation to the electoral system adopted. We need only look at
areas where we might expect ideology to have been imparted or spread in order to realize that this is improbable.
For instance, all of Latin America was land colonized by
the Spanish and the Portuguese. Yet, when we analyze the
executive branches of the various governments, we find that
they have borrowed from the U.S model much more heavily than from the European model. 17 There are certain things
that can reasonably be expected to be passed on from one
country to another; English is the lingua franca of India;
besides the U.S., Japan and Cuba are the only countries in
the world that really care about baseball; and France's former colonies still make up a cultural and linguistic bloc.
However, Australia, Canada, and the U.S., all former British colonies, have widely disparate environmental attitudes,
despite their common heritage. As tempting and facile as it
would be to ascribe environmental performance to regional
ideologies, and to propose that electoral systems are just indicators of those ideologies, doing so would be inaccurate.
In this case, we see clear evidence for the rational choice,
institutionalist argument. We assert that it is specifically the
electoral process which not only causes more people to vote
for greener parties but also encourages politicians to legislate for better environmental protection.

Hypotheses
In an attempt to empirically test these causal relationships, we estimate two models using different measures of
PR versus FPTP. The variable of interest in the first model
is a dummy variable for PRo In this model we predict that
PR will have a positive effect on the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and transparency will also have a
positive, although nonlinear, relationship to the EPI. We
predict that there may be decreasing returns to transparency, which will be shown by a negative coefficient on the
transparency-squared term. In other words:
• Hypothesis 1: PR will be positively correlated and statistically significant to the EPI.
• Hypothesis 2: Transparency will be positively and significantly related to the EPr.
• Hypothesis 3: Transparency-squared will be negatively
related to the EPI, showing decreasing returns to transparency's effect on environmental protection.
The second model will involve a measure of district
magnitude, which will more precisely estimate the effect
of PRo We expect this model to give us a result similar to
the coefficient on PR, that is:
49
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• Hypothesis 4: District magnitude will be positively and
significantly related to the EPI.
• Subsequent sections of this paper explain our methods
and evaluate the measures of each variable and present
the results.

Data
We aim to explore the causal relationship between environmental performance and the type of electoral system
through a quantitative analysis. While qualitative studies are
sometimes useful, a quantitative study allows us to expand
our number of cases and test our hypotheses cross-nationally. This allows for the development of more generalized
and applicable results. As the necessary data is available for
a fairly large selection of countries, we can test the effects
of electoral systems on a wide array of countries.
In combination with the theoretical framework, the
quantitative elements of our study build a convincing
case for causation. We control for any variables that may
indicate correlation rather than causation, such as, per
capita wealth, democracy, education, corruption, attitudes,
etc. Any relation we predict through the type of electoral
system is unlikely to be so highly correlated with another
variable that the results, instead, demonstrate the effects
of an alternate explanation. It is also highly unlikely that
there will be any problems with endogeneity, which is
most likely one of the causes of some kind of spurious
causal relationship as the coefficient on the explanatory
variable would be highly correlated with the error term.
There is no theoretical reason apparent to us that could
account for the level of environmental performance
influencing the type of political system. While it may
be possible that the type of electoral system reflects
the influence on an alternate electoral variable, such as,
open or closed list or the number of effective parties, the
theoretical reasoning behind the importance of electoral
system provides fairly strong evidence that this is unlikely
to be the case. Still, there is no definitive way to test
for causality versus correlation; thus, many empiricists
assert that while numerical analysis certainly provides
evidence of correlation, causation can be slightly more
elusive. IS Despite this, the case for causality is strong,
although mere correlation does not seriously undermine
our conclusions or policy implications. The text that
follows will outline the model selection, methodology,
and regression results. In combination with the theoretical
framework, these elements build a compelling case for
the importance of the electoral system in determining the
level of environmental performance.

Environmental Performance Index
As our dependent variable measuring environmental
performance, we use a very recently developed comprehensive dataset called the EPI.I9 Developed in 2006, it
involves a composite ranking theoretically between zero
50

and one hundred. The ranking quantifies the level of environmental performance with respect to the following two
overarching policy objectives: first, the environment as it
relates to human health, and second, ecosystem vitality
and natural resource management. These indicators are
purposefully linked to government environmental policy
rather than natural endowments, thus the indicators measure the effectiveness of preserving what endowments already exist rather than measuring the state of the environment at a given time. This measurement is more germane
to our study, as it evaluates the political factors and the
human impact on the environment rather than a more intangible measurement of sustainability.
The first core area of the EPI measures the environmental impact on health by looking at the influences of
environmental factors on morbidity and mortality rates.
This aspect of the measurement represents a fairly anthropocentric measure that is probably the least controversial measure of environmental standards. It includes
no assumption of the inherent value of the environment;
the indicators simply reflect natural human preferences
against disease and death. The indicators used, such as,
water supply, sanitation, and child mortality, are all incorporated by the Millennium Development Goals as part of
environmental objectives that are, for the most part, universally recognized. Two measures of air quality-urban
particulates and indoor air pollution-also factor into the
equation, as they have significant health implications.
Using slightly more complex and varied indicators
of environmental performance, the second core area of
the EPI measures ecosystem vitality and natural resource
management. Within this measurement is air quality,
estimated by the level of urban particulates and groundlevel ozone. A value for water resources was quantified
through measures of water consumption rates and
pollutants discharged into water bodies.
Government policy also receives attention in the
measurement of this second core area. Government
policies involving the maintenance of productive natural
resources are measured with a focus on how these policies
seek to protect natural resources versus exploiting them
for economic gain. In regard to biodiversity and habitat,
the indicators examine not only the percentage of land
designated as protected wilderness, but also the evenness in
the amount of protection accorded to various biomes. The
latter is important because the internationally recognized
goal of protecting at least 10 percent of a country's territory
may still result in grave ecological damage if the spread
of protection covers only a homogenous area. Finally, this
second core area uses a measurement of sustainable energy
created from data on energy consumption, the percentage
of total energy from a renewable energy source, and carbon
dioxide emissions per unit of GDP. This measurement
of environmental performance is one of the most
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comprehensive to date and is well tailored to the objective
of our study. The relevance of these measurements is that
they focus on government policies toward the environment,
not necessarily on their outcomes, which can reflect the
influence of numerous other factors.

Electoral System
For our main independent variable analyzing the
affect of the electoral system, we run regressions with two
different measures. We first use the World Bank's Political
Institutions dataset;"o it includes a dichotomous variable
for the use of proportional representation in the legislative
elections. A value of one indicates the presence of PR;
however, a value of one may also indicate a mixed system
in which voters determine a certain percentage of the
legislature through PR and the remainder through plurality.
This measure will tell us if the presence of PR, whether the
sole vote transfer mechanism or part of a mixed system, has
a significant effect on environmental performance.
We use district magnitude as the second measure
of electoral system, taken from Joel Johnson and Jessica
Wallack's Electoral Institutions and the Personal Vote
dataset. 21 They code district magnitude for both the average
district and the average legislator. The authors point
out the precision of the latter measure, as it controls for
exceptionally small or large districts. However, we choose
to use the measurement of the average district due to greater
availability of data. If a country has a district magnitude
of one, then it uses a FPTP system, whereas numbers
greater than one indicate the use of a PR system. This
measurement allows us to better nuance our argument and
separate electoral system effects, which helps determine
the incentives that politicians face. 22 Oue to the vote-to-seat
ratio, a country with an average district magnitude of two
or three will be much more similar to a FPTP system than a
country with an average district magnitude of fifteen. There
are a few outlying cases, and we exclude all cases where
district magnitude is greater than twenty-five. It is standard
practice to exclude any extreme variables, as they have a
tendency to skew results. With these qualifications in place,
the district magnitude measurement thus enhances our
ability to test the causal logic that PR systems allow smaller
parties that focus on a single issue, such as, the environment,
to have some representation in the legislature. Oistricts
that elect a higher number of representatives, thus having
a high district magnitude, provide more chances for small
parties to gain representation; whereas, districts that elect a
lower number of representatives, thus having a low district
magnitude, encourage parties and candidates that appeal to
a broad constituency and may discourage politicians and
parties from taking a strong stand on the environment.
Control Variables
Several factors combine to explain environmental
performance, and we attempt to control tor these factors

in order to accurately identify the effect of the main explanatory variable: PRo The environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) is a popular, if controversial, explanation of the
level of environmental protection. The EKC is meant to
predict the relationship between environmental degradation and economic development as measured by GOP. As
a country begins to develop, the level of environmental
degradation increases until it reaches a certain point of
development, at which point environmental performance
then begins to improve; this relationship graphically forms
an inverted U-shape. According to Esty, the EKC can be
broken down into three effects: technique effects, composition effects, and scale effects. Technique effects arise when
greener technologies are developed; composition effects
are defined by a shift in consumption preferences toward
greener goods; and scale effects refer to higher degradation due to increased economic activity and wealth.23 The
EKC defines the relative relationship among these three
factors, with decreasing environmental degradation as a
consequence of composition and technique effects outweighing scale effects. The relative effects ofthese factors
indicate at which part of the EKC each country is located
and determines the environmental effects of growth. This
relationship necessitates that we account for the effects of
economic development. Thus, we include a measurement
of wealth in our model. We measure wealth as the per
capita GOP of a country, adjusted for purchasing power
parity. We take the log of GOP in order to reduce the right
skew of the data and normalize it. The log of GOP lets
us look at percent change rather than dollar differences in
GOP among countries, which will allow for more meaningful comparison.
Contrary to the theory set forth in the EKC, our data
actually estimates a linear relationship with respect to GOP
and environmental performance as measured by the EPI.
On account of the measurement of the EPI being somewhat
nonstandard and more related to the political mechanisms
for protecting the environment, a linear relationship seems
more plausible. While the theoretical backing on the EKC
is interesting and sometimes does explain certain cases,
several authors have challenged the EKe's assumptions
on the distribution of income and the effects oftrade,"4 and
its empirical validity.25
While education levels, as reflected by literacy rates,
may be strongly correlated to GOP, this variable addresses
development in a broader sense than simply an increase
in GOP. While the EKC generally addresses only the
relationship between GOP and environmental degradation,
the relationship may go beyond mere measurements
of wealth to include the level of development as the
definitive variable. Further, literacy will better address
the changes in a country that are more specifically related
to development. This variable could also measure any
changes in attitude that are not accounted for in the post51
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materialist index. While this index will estimate much of
the change in attitudes due to economic development, it
will not necessarily account for changes in attitude that
relate to greater exposure to environmental issues. The use
of the literacy rate as our education measurement accounts
for the level of education throughout the entire population,
which helps to eliminate the bias of social class and gender.
Literacy also accounts for the effects of various types of
education (e.g., informal, trade schools, etc.) increasing
the overall level of education, which formal enrolment
rates have difficulty capturing. Literacy skills will open
up the channels of communication and knowledge, where
even the ability to read a local newspaper could change
environmental attitudes at a more basic level. This
measurement then accounts for differences stemming
from development and changes in environmental attitudes
due to increased exposure.
Manus Midlarsk y26 demonstrates the positive effect
of democracy on environmental performance. Scholars
have also shown that environmental degradation has a disproportionate effect on certain segments of the population.
particularly the poorY Theoretically, democracies should
allow these disadvantaged sectors to better convey their
opinions and to better affect environmental outcomes. The
incentive for politicians to gain support, and thus votes,
should also impact the responsiveness of policy and performance in democracies. Autocrats who do not rely on a
broad constituency to derive power and authority are less
likely to care about conditions that do not directly affect
them, such as, environmental degradation. With a strong
theoretical backing and favourable empirical analysis, it is
imperative to include democracy as a control variable. We
measure it using the Polity IV dataset. 2~ This measurement
scores countries from zero to ten, with ten being the most
democratic. The rating is determined based upon four categories: competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
We have also included a transparency variable to
determine the level of corruption in a country. First,
corruption will affect the way the political system
operates. High levels of corruption may impede the
voters' check on their politicians, as voters may be
prone to support a candidate due to bribery and favours
rather than platforms and promised policies. Voters may
not even cast their own votes, or votes may not all be
legitimately counted. The absence of voters who are able
to legitimately influence policy undermines the causal
logic that we have put forth, in which PR systems are
better able to incorporate small, single-issue parties into
the government. If corruption obstructs the channels of
democracy, then party platforms and issues may not have
a significant affect on voters' choices.
The concerns regarding corruption are particularly

salient in the consideration of environmental issues. As
previously addressed, business interest groups and labor
unions have significant resources available to them. In addition, big business may constitute one of the last groups
to embrace restrictions meant to protect the environment,
as such restrictions often lead to more expensive production costs and chip away at profits. In order to prevent
the implementation of protective environmental policies,
labor groups may draw on their deep pockets to convince
politicians to pursue a different policy. While "bargaining" may never disappear from the political arena, this
type of bribery will be less likely in a country with high
levels of transparency; therefore, transparency should be
positively related to the EPI.
We use the measurement of Transparency International to measure the degree of transparency in a country. Transparency International measures corruption on a
scale of zero to ten, with ten being the most transparent.
Transparency International 29 defines corruption as "the
abuse of public office for private gain," and uses surveys
to detennine perceptions of corruption in a given country. While Daniel Treisman points out that this does not
account for the experiences of the average citizen with
corruption, this study aims to understand corruption more
generally across the country and to compare levels crossnationally.30 Treisman also points out that the Transparency International ratings correlate strongly with other
cross-national measures of corruption; this correlation
allows for meaningful comparisons. It is important to
mention that we have also included a squared-tenn for
transparency. A look at the data reveals a curvilinear relationship between transparency and the EPI. The regression results when a squared term was not included indicated the need to account for this nonlinear relationship.
Statistical significance improves with the addition of a
squared term, allowing us to better predict the level of
environmental performance.
The causal logic that we put forth also necessitates
the inclusion of environmental attitude in our model. If
electoral systems are to have any affect on environmental performance it is through the means by which they
encourage politicians to appeal to their constituencies
and the way in which they capture voters' attitudes. 31
Whether citizens of a country generally support environmental protection, are indifferent to it, or do not
place it as a high priority that will affect the attention
given to the environment in the political arena. Ifvoters
do not care about the environment, then even the emergence of a party that focuses on environmental issues
may be unlikely, not to mention the likelihood of the
party's rise to power.
In any study, one finds great difficulty in accounting
for and predicting attitudes. Attitude discernment is
complex even with well crafted surveys and the high
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level of variance among populations makes it challenging
to obtain an accurate sample. The World Values Survey 32
no doubt faces these constraints. but still assembles the
most complete compilation of values and attitudes in
many countries. The World Values Survey asks a series
of five questions about the environment. but none seemed
to capture the overall value placed on environmentalism
and the level of environmental protection in the country.
In addition to this, the World Values Survey included
fewer measures of environmental attitudes than our final
measurement did; this reduced our total observations and
detracted from the significance of the analysis.
We turned instead to the two questions on the World
Values Survey that ascertain the presence of post-materialism, and subscribed to Ronald Inglehart's33 assertion that
as material needs are met, people then tum their focus to
non-material concerns. Several scholars 34 have shown that
environmentalism should be included as a post-materialist
value, and the degree of materialist values in a country
indicate or are at least strongly correlated with environmental attitudes. The post-materialist values indicator
combines answers from two questions (see Appendix), the
composite of which determines if a country is materialist
(a score of one). post-materialist (three), or a mix (two).
Thus, we expect to see a positive coefficient on this variable, as a higher value reflects the presence of post-materialist values. Again, while the inclusion of this variable
reduces the number of cases by about half, the theoretical
arguments for its inclusion are compelling.

Methods
We will test our hypotheses using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression. Our analysis includes fifty-five
countries. The limited availability of data on environmental attitudes creates the main limitation on the number of
cases we have included. However, we cannot ignore the
strong theoretical reasons to include environmental attitudes in our analysis, and so we proceed with a limited
number of cases. Our case selection also runs the possibility of bias due to the fact that there were disproportionately
more developed countries in our survey than there were
less developed countries than a random sample would generate; twenty-eight out of the fifty-five countries sampled
are members of the OEeD. This is most likely because the
World Values Survey is biased toward countries that are
more developed. possibly as a result oflower survey costs
due to existing infrastructure, less restrictive governments,
or communication barriers. In any case, the variables for
attitudes decreased our survey from ninety-eight observations to fifty-two observations, leaving out many developing countries and keeping in all members of the G-8 and
all but one of the OEeD countries (Luxembourg). Ifthere
is some inherent difference between these developed and
less developed countries this could bias our results. This

bias could be due to higher education that basic literacy is
unable to control for, some kind of nonlinearity with GDP,
or cultural differences that attitudes are unable to pick up.
Therefore, we attempt to control for this relationship between development (a broader definition of development
than income provides) and environmental performance
using a binary variable for OEeD membership. The summary statistics are included in Table 1 (page 54):
The data section discusses some of the challenges
encountered in this analysis. The reliance on the data collection of others always poses some concern, particularly
due to the risk ofmiscoded information. While most of the
data that we have used comes from fairly standard sources,
such as the World Bank and the Polity database, the survey data from Transparency International and the World
Values Survey may potentially be susceptible to these
problems. Survey research poses a problem in any field.
Problems can occur in the creation of the survey (certain
questions may produce biased answers), the execution of
the survey (communication problems, self-reporting. disinterested respondents), and the coding of the information
obtained through the survey. While both Transparency International and the World Values Survey are well executed
surveys and reputable sources. these challenges remain a
legitimate concern. Furthermore, extracting the attitudes
of an entire country on a polarizing issue like the environment always constitutes a formidable challenge.

Results
Dummy PR Variable
In order to accentuate the importance of our main
model and the findings on the significance of the
district magnitude. we have included the original model
using a dummy variable for PRo The variable is coded
one, if any type of PR system is in place, and zero, if
not. Based on the literature. we first predicted that PR
would have a significant and positive effect on the EPI.
Using this variable as a general measure of the many
theoretically positive effects of PR on the environment
(i.e., both the consistency argument and the special
interest group argument), this measure shows how the
identification of a country's political system affects its
environmental protection. This measure does not account
for the possibility of varying degrees of representation, or
differentiate between any theoretical causal mechanism.
Thus, we began our estimation using a binary for PR, and
the results are shown in Table 2.
At first, these results seemed to do a good job of
explaining the differences in environmental performance
among different countries. The R2 at 0.82 is high, meaning that the model explains approximately 82 percent of
the variation in the EPI. The remaining 18 percent may
be explained by variables that are not controlled for by
the model. or more likely may represent inherent vari53
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Range

Variable

Environmental Perfonnance
Index (EPI)
.. :{
Literacy
GDP per capita ".
LogGDP
.Democracy
Transparency
Transparency Squared
@
District Magnitude
Post-Mate.rialist Values

Median

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min.

Max

41.1

88

75.55

71.5 2

11.93

41.1

99

97.75

91.47

13.54

723

42,364

11 ,489

15,962.42

12,434.89

6.58

10.65

9.35

9.27

1.03

0

10

9

7.42

3.42

1.5

9.7

3.95

4.88

2.57

2.25

94.09

15.6 1

30.28

29.03

1

150

6.46

19.59

37.90

1

3

1

1.48

0.57

Table 2: Regression Estimates for Model Using Binary PR
R2= 0.82
Adj R2= 0.78

Variables
EPI

Coefficient

T-statistic

P-value

Intercept

14.1 2

-0.7 1

0.48 1

Literacy 200S

0.28

0.08

3.76

0.001

LogGDP

4.86

2.06

2. 36

0.023

Democracy

-0.59

0.39

-1 .53

0.132

Transparency

3. 13

2.47

1.26

0.213

Transparencyl

-0.20

0.19

- 1.06

0. 293

2. 15

0.63

0.530

BinaryPR

1.36

Attitudes

3.01

1. 70

1.77

0.084

OECO

1.52

2.68

0.5 7

0.572

ability. Overall, this is compelling evidence that the independent variables are well chosen and that the model
is valid.
These results correspond well to those estimated in the
second model, but there are some unexpected findings.
The variables for literacy, GDP, and democracy all have
fairly consistent estimates, and the significance does not
change between models. Literacy works well as a control
variable, as it is strongly correlated with environmental
protection, and GDP has a similarly predictable result,
as it is also significant and positive. Surprisingly, GDP
and literacy are the only statistically significant variables
at the .05 confidence level, yet the model overall holds
strong predictive power, which may indicate some degree
of multicollinearity.
Another similar red flag for multicollinearity is the
negative, statistically insignificant coefficient on democratic openness. This result would imply that greater
democratic openness and transparency leads to less environmental protection, yet the opposite result has been
empirically proven previously.35 Multicollinearity is often
54

Std. Error

-10.03

exhibited in strong overall estimation with few individually significant variables, and if multicollinearity is present
it can also predict the wrong signs for some coefficients.
Multicollinearity is likely the culprit behind this surprising prediction on democratic openness.
Democratic openness has proven to be highly correlated with education levels and GDP and is apt to be correlated with favorable attitudes toward the environment.
Citizens in a country that is more open to democracy, oftentimes, have greater opportunities for education beyond
basic literacy- these effects are not picked up by our literacy variable. Also, as democratic openness increases,
knowledge regarding global environmental problems may
be disseminated more quickly to the general public, as reflected by a freer press. These two effects could theoretically lead to some sort of correlation between democratic
openness and attitudes. Strong empirical support validates
a correlation between these variables.
The predictive power of democracy and attitudes
together is significant with an F-stat for democracy and
attitudes together as 2.58, yet neither coefficient is sig-
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through these and other tests we determined that the binary
PR value simply did not have the significant effect that we
had predicted. While at first disheartening, this makes the
results for the second model using district magnitude all
the more interesting.

nificant on its own at this high level. While the estimation
on democratic openness is unexpected, our model is still
valid and this estimate does not bias our main explanatory
variable in any way. While this model as a whole has good
explanatory power and lends legitimacy to our variable selection, the statistical insignificance of some of the results
reduces its validity.
This model estimates the level of transparency as
statistically insignificant. We expected transparency to
increase the level of environmental performance at a decreasing rate, so the model exhibits the expected signs;
however, the P-values are very high which really limits
the model's credibility. The estimation on attitudes also
presents a variable with the expected sign, but the results
are not significant. Surprisingly this significance changes
when a more precise specification of PR is used in the
next model. We will explore the potential reasons for this
change in significance, but first let us review our main explanatory variable and its effect in this model.
Initially, we predicted that the binary PR variable may
not be significant simply due to multicollinearity; therefore, we tested the correlation between democracy and
PR, as it seemed to have the most intuitive connection.
The correlation matrix is as shown in Table 3.
Because the PR and democracy variables exhibit some
degree of multicollinearity, we assumed that perhaps the
low and insignificant effect of PR was simply consumed
in the coefficient on democracy. However, looking at the
correlation matrix, we can see that democracy and PR are
not very highly correlated. Also, the F-stat on this variable is only 1.24, showing that both variables together do
not significantly predict the EPl. After analyzing the data

District Magnitude
In the second model, we estimated the effect of
PR using a different measurement, and found that it
significantly affected the EPl. In the second and most
important model (Table 5) the only modified variable is
that representing PR, changing from a binary to the number
elected to the legislature from each district. This model
more accurately estimates the degree of proportional
representation because as this district magnitude increases
it reflects the variance of the voters' preferences with
more precision. A higher number of seats also increases
the likelihood of smaller interest groups obtaining seats
in the legislature; this occurrence directly relates to one of
the theoretical reasons why PR matters. We hypothesized
earlier that a larger role for small interest groups facilitates
more "green" policies; hence, the number of members in
a district should lead to a significant, positive effect on
environmental protection. The estimates for this second
model are shown in Table 4.
We are correct in our hypothesis that the number
of members in the legislature elected from each district
is a more accurate predictor for the environment. Our
R2 increases by almost 5 percent while the number
of variables stays the same, showing that the overall
explanatory power increases. In terms of the control
variables, literacy and GDP still have a significant, positive

Table 3: Correlation Matrix for Democracy and PR

DemO<:
Democ

1.0

PR

0.397

PR

1.0

Table 4: Regression Estimates for Model Using Number of Members in a District
j

EPI

Rl:;:;: 0.839
Adj Rl= 0.81

-

Variables
Coefficient

Std. Error

T-statistk

P-value

Intercept

-16.6

12. 13

-1.37

0.178

Literacy_2005

0.23

0.07

3.18

0.003

LogGDP

5.63

1.80

3.12

0.003

Democracy

-0.45

0.33

-1.38

0.173

Transparency

4.42

2.41

1.83

0.073

Transparencyl

-0.33

0.19

-1 .69

0.097

Memberdist.

0.32

0.148

2.14

0.038

Attitudes

3.11

1.70

1.83

0.Q75

OECD

0.01

2.62

0.00

0.997
55

,
BEYOND DEMOCRACY

effect on environmental performance, which confirms
previous research on the subject. The only real issue
with this model is the consistently unexpected sign of the
coefficient on democracy. The only thing that this could
mean is potential multicollinearity, but this does not pose
any problems with the rest of our estimates, as discussed
earlier. This model does, however, solve all of the other
difficulties in estimation with the previous model.
We can see that the magnitude and significance of
political attitudes increases with this model because we
have a more precise estimation of the role of special
interests. This is consistent with the belief that a greater
diversity of interests is represented with an effective PR
system, and thus, environmental attitudes matter more
in terms of policy. Environmental attitudes are better
represented in a PR system, and this can be seen through
more environmentally sound policies. Other control
variables also prove to be more significant in this model.
The coefficients on the transparency terms increase
in significance to the point that they are significant at
the 0.10 level. As Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 36
have shown, PR actually has a slightly positive effect on
transparency and similarly, with a more precise measure for
PR, corruption matters more in our model. We hypothesized
that an increase in transparency would actuall y create better
environmental performance. Environmental amenities and
natural resources are important public goods that depend
on the right incentives for governments-incentives that
are skewed by comlption. Therefore, controlling for this
nonlinear relationship is important in proper estimation.
The coefficients on the transparency and the transparency-squared variables show the direction in which
transparency effects the environment, and then the rate at
which this effect is taking place (as it is nonlinear it will
not affect environmental performance at a constant rate).
The positive coefficient shows that at the mean, as transparency increases by one, the EPr is improved by 4.42,
and the estimate on transparency-squared shows that as
transparency increases, the rate at which it affects the EPr
is mitigated. Conceptually, this could result from the transparency variable scale being nonlinear in some way (that
is, a change from zero to one is larger than a change from
four to five), or because a relationship exhibiting decreasing returns exists between transparency and environmental
performance, or a combination of both these effects occurring simultaneously. The initial reductions in corruption
could matter a lot to environmental performance as the
conditions of anarchy and disorder (dumping environmental waste, bribing officials to bypass emissions standards,
etc.) are mitigated. Yet, after a certain point, reductions in
corruption are less dramatically related to the environment
(these increases in transparency would create better electoral processes, etc.). Most likely, decreasing marginal returns to transparency account for at least a portion of this
56

effect and, in addition to our main explanatory variable,
could have interesting practical implications.
Our dummy variable control for OECD countries
picks up an interesting and previously undiscussed effect in both models. We included this variable to limit any
selection bias because there are disproportionately more
OECD countries than a random sample would include.
This dummy variable controls for any inherent differences in environmental protection with respect to membership in the OECD versus non-membership, which
might pick up any shifts in environmental protection that
our control variables do not address. Our estimate is actually surprising because it shows no statistically significant
difference between these two groups. The only estimates
that change when we include the OECD dummy variable
are those for literacy and GDP. This means that the OECD
estimate is most likely picking up wealth and education
effects. Estimating the model with a control for G-8 membership rather than OECD membership actually predicts
the opposite effect, G-8 countries have worse environmental performance. However, this result is likely biased
by the u.s. and Russia, who are notorious for relatively
low environmental standards compared to other parts of
the developed world. Thus, we can be assured that our
model represents a robust predictor of environmental performance that guarantees the validity of the results on our
main explanatory variable.
Our main predictor is significant when measured
according to district magnitUde, where the binary variable
for PR versus FPTP is not significant. The measurement on
district magnitude more precisely estimates the likelihood
of a special interest group or party obtaining one or more
seats in the legislature. Where a one-member district is a
FPTP system and presents opportunities only for large and
established parties, single-interest parties are increasingly
likely to obtain seats in the legislature with a greater district
magnitude. The coefficient shows that when one more
member of the legislature is added from each electoral
district, the EPI increases by .32; this information confirms
our hypotheses that PR matters because of increased
opportunities to special interest groups.
While the coefficient on district magnitude may seem
insufficiently large to represent real, tangible change in
environmental performance, it is important to again look
at the measure of the EPI. The EPI measures environmental health, air quality, water resources, biodiversity
and habitat, productive natural resources, and sustainable
energy. While governments have a substantial influence
on environmental performance, there are nevertheless
constraints on both the policymaker's realm of influence
and natural factors. In addition to the control variables accounted for in this model, variability in the EPr can also be
explained by colonial heritage, pollution from external
sources where effects are distributed interspatially, deg-
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radation where effects are distributed intertemporally, international standards, or environmental shocks, specific
to each country. Hence, while the effect of district magnitude may initially seem insignificant, due to the variety
of complex determinants of environmental performance,
any political influence should be given due credit.

Conclusion
As our results show, the mere presence of a PR
system does not significantly influence a country's
environmental attitudes; rather, the district magnitude in
PR systems is the determining factor. These results are
important for two principal reasons. First, we are able to
access the inner workings of democracies as they interact
with policies and constituents. In this instance, the results
themselves are not as important as the fact that there are
results and that they show a noticeable difference in the
performances of democracies.
But why is this significant? The advantages of
democracies over non-democracies are so obvious and
so multitudinous that it becomes tempting to ignore the
differences among democracies for the facile contrast
between democratic systems and other systems. Too
often. dysfunctional democratic states are lionized for the
sheer fact that they are democratic instead of being offered
comparisons and suggestions from more functional states.
Along this same vein, non-democratic states are merely
urged to "democratize" without being offered specific
examples or methods to do so.
This research will help with states' attempts to improve their environmental records. This research shows
the importance of incorporating smaller groups into the
political arena and the effects that this will have on environmental policy. The implications of our study do not
limit themselves to improving environmental attitudes
or the study of electoral systems. This disparity among
democratic electoral systems and their environmental performance should be considered indicative of larger trends
within the study of democracies.
Following these results, research should be done to determine what aspects of democracies affect such vital issues
as women's rights, education, economic growth, or even
human rights, all issues whose representation in democracies is hardly equal. When this research is done, states will
be able to analyze the results and compare them against the
specific aspects of their governing systems. Thus, states
participating in human rights abuses will see what influences respect for human rights in other democracies, or
states that need to give more equal opportunities to women
will see what specific aspects of democracy have the most
positive correlation to women's rights. Furthermore, when
currently non-democratic states do decide to democratize,
they can look at the problems unique to their country, the
corpus of research devoted to those certain problems, and,

then, choose to implement democratic systems designed
specifically to target those problems.
The second significant part of our research is the
proven desirability of the integration of interest groups
into the political arena in a way that is not driven entirely
by money. The obvious differences between systems
with low district magnitude. or FPTP systems, and PR
systems with high district magnitude highlight the role
that special interest groups play in the political system,
specifically, the role that they are allowed to play and
the effects they are allowed to have as determined by
the limiting factors of the electoral system. The positive
effects of an increased participation by special interest
groups could easily translate to other areas of public policy or social needs. In addition to the increased role of
special interest groups, the interaction between financial
contributions from these groups and favorable legislation passed for them might be drastically reduced. As
money gradually becomes less significant, confidence in
the government is likely to grow and democratic institutions are likely to be strengthened.
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